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5M
uch budgetary and policy action was taken by
the Bush administration and Congress in the
immediate aftermath of the attacks of Sept. 11,
2001 — before a long-term plan and strategy
for responding to newly-evident security challenges
was worked out. The Defense Department’s Quadren-
nial Defense Review, laying out the nation’s military
strategy and plans, was released soon after Sept. 11
without much modification. Billions of dollars were
added to the defense budget without a clear plan about
what to spend them on. Finally, a year after the at-
tacks, the White House issued a National Security
Strategy document that identifies foreign policy and
national security policy goals — if not how to get there.
But are these the right choices, and how best should
resources be allocated to reach those or alternative
goals? The papers in this briefing book try to expand
and deepen a debate about these issues that are now
vital to every American.
Steven Kosiak of the Center for Strategic and Bud-
getary Assessments brings clarity to the complicated
slew of new spending on defense, homeland security,
and combating terrorism in a piece on 2001-03 bud-
gets. Cindy Williams of MIT provides a key frame-
work for thinking about and balancing tradeoffs in
broad strategic responses to global mass-casualty ter-
rorism. David Gold of the New School University il-
lustrates how economic tools and leverage can comple-
ment and substitute for military and diplomatic ac-
tion, citing three case studies. William Hartung of the
World Policy Institute explores the options of preven-
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Marcus Corbin
Director, Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
tive diplomatic and economic measures versus pre-
emptive military strikes. Carl Conetta of the Project
on Defense Alternatives looks at alternatives choices
for military transformation — since the Cold War,
post-9/11, and for the future. Winslow Wheeler of the
Center for Defense Information examines costs and
tradeoffs within the military, between certain military
personnel benefits and readiness for military opera-
tions. James Galbraith and Shama Gamkhar of the
University of Texas at Austin present homeland secu-
rity issues facing the local, state, and federal levels of
government, and resource allocation between them.
Anita Dancs of the National Priorities Project looks
at the cost and consequences of focusing on military
security to the exclusion of economic security at home.
These papers are brief versions of more in-depth
analyses that are available online at www.cdi.org/spwg,
along with an executive summary of this volume. For
more information about this briefing book and re-
lated products contact the editor, Marcus Corbin, at
the Center for Defense Information, mcorbin@cdi.org.
Some of the material in this volume has also been
used in a citizen guide to national security issues en-
titled A Safer America? available from the National
Priorities Project, info@nationalpriorities.org.
The views expressed in these papers are those of
the individual author alone, and no sharing of opin-
ion is implied by appearance together in this volume.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the generous
support of the Ford Foundation, which made this
project possible.

7Funding for Defense, Homeland Security
and Combating Terrorism Since 9/11
Where has all the money gone?
T
he tragic events of September 11, 2001 have had
a significant impact on federal spending related
to defense, homeland security and combating ter-
rorism. The purpose of this backgrounder is to
provide an estimate of just how much funding for
these missions has been increased since 9-11, and to
specify, to the extent possible, how that funding has
been allocated.1
It is impossible to say precisely how much of the
increase in spending that has occurred since 9-11 is
attributable to the terrorist attacks themselves. Other
factors have undoubtedly contributed to the growth
in spending as well. However, the terrorist attacks of
9-11 have clearly been the most significant cause of
the increase. Consistent with this fact, programs and
activities related to homeland security and combat-
ing terrorism have been the main beneficiaries of the
spending increases implemented since 9-11. But they
have not been the only beneficiaries. In particular,
some Department of Defense (DoD) programs and
activities that are unrelated, or
only indirectly related, to these
missions have also benefited
substantially.
In brief, this analysis finds that:
 Since the terrorist attacks of
9-11, US funding related to
defense, homeland security
and combating terrorism has been increased by some
$145-160 billion. This figure represents the level of
funding provided over the fiscal year (FY) 2001-03
period that is above what would have been projected
to have been spent in these areas, over these years, had
funding simply been increased at the rate of inflation.
 Assuming Congress approves the level of funding
requested for homeland security and combating
terrorism in the administration’s FY 2003 budget
request for non-defense departments and agencies
when it reconvenes early in 2003, annual funding
for these programs will be about $18 billion higher
than it was prior to 9-11. This represents a real (in-
flation-adjusted) increase of about 240 percent.
 DoD’s FY 2003 budget is about $48 billion higher
than the last pre-9-11 annual defense budget. This
represents a real increase of 15 percent. Only about
one-third of this increase appears to be for pro-
grams and activities closely related to homeland se-
curity and combating terrorism.
 The bulk of the funding increases for homeland
security and combating terrorism provided for FY
2001 and FY 2002 were included in three large
emergency supplemental appropriations, which to-
gether contained some $64 billion. DoD has re-
ceived about $30 billion, or 47
percent of the funding pro-
vided in these supplementals.
The next largest recipients
have been the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency
(FEMA) ($11 billion) and the
Department of Transporta-
tion ($7 billion).
 Most of the emergency funding provided to non-
DoD departments and agencies has been used to
help recover from the attacks of 9-11 and for vic-
tim relief, or to improve aviation security and se-
curity at critical, non-DoD facilities located around
the world. Altogether, these activities have absorbed
Steven M. Kosiak
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Since the terrorist attacks of 9-11,
US funding related to defense,
homeland security and combating
terrorism has been increased by
some $145-160 billion.
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at least $25 billion of the emergency funding pro-
vided since 9-11.
 In recent years, DoD has received about one-third
of the federal funding for homeland security and
combating terrorism provided through the regu-
lar annual appropriations bills. The next largest re-
cipients of non-emergency funding for homeland
security and combating terrorism in recent years
have been the Departments of Transportation and
Justice.
 Programs and activities closely related to homeland
security and combating terrorism continue to ab-
sorb a relatively small share of DoD’s overall bud-
get. The Office of Management and Budget’s
(OMB’s) and DoD’s own estimates suggest that DoD
will spend roughly $20-30 billion on these activities
in FY 2003. This is equivalent to some 5-10 percent
of the recently enacted FY 2003 defense budget.
Moreover, some of this
funding may be provided in
a future FY 2003 supple-
mental appropriation.
 If policymakers are to effec-
tively determine how much
funding needs to be pro-
vided for homeland secu-
rity and combating terror-
ism in the future, the administration will have to
begin providing substantially more detailed, com-
prehensive, and clear data and cost estimates con-
cerning these missions than it has to date.
OVERALL FUNDING INCREASES
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, US
funding related to defense, homeland security and
combating terrorism has been increased substantially.
Assuming that Congress approves the level of fund-
ing requested for homeland security and combating
terrorism in the President’s FY 2003 budget request
for non-defense departments and agencies when it
reconvenes early in 2003, the total increase since 9-11
would amount to about $160 billion. On the other
hand, if those programs and activities were instead
funded only at their current levels through the remain-
der of FY 2003, the total increase since 9-11 would
amount to about $145 billion.
These estimates represent the additional amount
of federal funding for defense, homeland security and
combating terrorism provided above and beyond what
would have been projected to have been spent in these
areas had funding simply been increased at the rate of
inflation. As such, they reflect increases in real pur-
chasing power, and not merely nominal dollar in-
creases. In other words, over the FY 2001-03 period, a
total of $145-160 billion more has been provided for
these broad mission areas than would have been
needed to simply keep pace with inflation. Table 1
summarizes the different components of the $160 bil-
lion estimate.
These estimates may overstate the impact of 9-11
on funding for defense, homeland security and com-
bating terrorism. This is be-
cause the starting point for the
inflation-adjusted baseline
used in this analysis was cal-
culated using the levels of
funding provided in the FY
2001 annual appropriations
bills. Arguably, a better start-
ing point would be the levels
of funding provided in the FY 2002 annual appropria-
tions bills. This is because it is likely that increases in
some or all of these areas would have been enacted in
the FY 2002 annual appropriations bills even absent
the terrorist attacks of 9-11. The administration had
requested funding increases for many of these pro-
grams and activities in its initial FY 2002 budget re-
quests, which were submitted to Congress more than
six months before 9-11. In particular, it had requested
a substantial increase in funding for defense (though
this request did not include large increases in funding
for DoD programs and activities related to homeland
security or combating terrorism).
Since the funding levels proposed, prior to 9-11,
for FY 2002 were substantially higher than the levels
Programs and activities closely
related to homeland security and
combating terrorism continue to
absorb a relatively small share of
DoD’s overall budget.
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enacted in the FY 2001 annual appropriations bills,
choosing an FY 2002 inflation-adjusted baseline in-
stead would lessen the apparent impact of 9-11 on
spending. Specifically, if FY 2002 were used as the start-
ing point for the inflation-adjusted baseline rather
than FY 2001, the total increase in funding for defense,
homeland security and combating terrorism would
amount to some $105-120 billion. In the end, how-
ever, although there is no “right answer,” choosing the
FY 2001 inflation-adjusted baseline appears to be the
sounder approach. This is for the simple reason that,
while the administration had proposed FY 2002 fund-
ing increases, prior to 9-11, for defense and some pro-
grams related to homeland security and combating
terrorism, most of these bills were not enacted until
after September 11, 2001.
FUNDING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
AND COMBATING TERRORISM
Precisely estimating funding levels for homeland se-
curity and combating terrorism is difficult, among
other things, because it is not always clear which fed-
eral programs and activities should be included in
these totals. The definition used in this analysis in-
cludes funding identified as related to homeland se-
curity and combating terrorism in a variety of admin-
istration and congressional documents.
According to OMB estimates, prior to the terrorist
attacks of 9-11, the administration and Congress had
provided about $20 billion for homeland security and
combating terrorism in FY 2001.2 After the attacks,
funding was increased for these activities both by pro-
viding more money in regular annual appropriations
bills and by enacting a series of emergency supplemen-
tal appropriations. And legislation affecting direct fed-
eral spending has provided another $11 billion in fund-
ing related to 9-11 over the FY 2001-03 period.3
Table 2 provides a rough breakdown of overall fed-
eral funding for homeland security and combating ter-
rorism over the FY 2001-2003 period.4 The figures for
FY 2003, in particular, are tentative. Among other
things, they assume that when Congress reconvenes
in January it will approve funding levels for domestic
homeland security and combating terrorism activi-
ties that are close to the levels included in the
administration’s FY 2003 request (US domestic de-
partments and agencies are currently being funded
through a stop-gap continuing resolution). Altogether,
TABLE 1: FUNDING FOR DEFENSE, HOMELAND
SECURITY & COMBATING TERRORISM SINCE 9-11 (in billions of dollars)
FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 01-03
Actual/Requested Funding
Homeland Security & Combating Terrorism* 45 71 56 172
Department of Defense** 301 327 364 991
Pre-9-11 Inflation-Adjusted Baseline
Homeland Security & Combating Terrorism 20 20 21 61
Department of Defense 301 310 317 927
Difference
Homeland Security & Combating Terrorism 25 51 35 111
Department of Defense 0 17 48 64
Subtotal 25 68 82 175
Adjustment for DoD Overlap 0 -1 -14 -15
TOTAL REAL GROWTH SINCE 9-11 25 67 68 160
* See table 2.  ** Excludes funding provided in post-9-11 emergency supplemental appropriations.
Sources: CSBA based on OMB, DoD, CBO and CRS data.
10
Security After 9/11: Strategy Choices and Budget Tradeoffs
as illustrated in Table 1, the level of funding provided
for these missions over the FY 2001-03 period is likely
to be about $111 billion more than would have been
provided over this period had funding simply been
increased at the rate of inflation.
DOD FUNDING SINCE 9-11
As the discussion above indicates, DoD accounts for a
significant portion of what the administration defines
as funding for homeland security and combating ter-
rorism. DoD has accounted for nearly half of all the
emergency funding provided since 9-11 and absorbs
about one-third of all funding for these missions pro-
vided in regular annual appro-
priations bills. According to
OMB and DoD figures, the
administration’s FY 2003 request
included as much as $32 billion
for homeland security and com-
bating terrorism. This included
a $10 billion war reserve fund to be used, as needed,
to cover unspecified future military operations (in Af-
ghanistan or elsewhere) related to the war on terror-
ism. Congress rejected this proposed fund, but appears
to have approved most (though not all) of the other
funding requested.5 This suggests that the level of
funding provided to DoD for missions related to
homeland security and combating terrorism is likely
to amount to some $22 billion in FY 2003. This is some
$14 billion more than would have been provided in
FY 2003 had funding for these missions simply been
increased at the rate of inflation.6 That is a substantial
increase. However, over that same period, DoD’s over-
all budget increased by signifi-
cantly more. The recently en-
acted FY 2003 defense budget is
about $48 billion above the FY
2001 inflation-adjusted baseline.
The portion of DoD’s
funding increase that has not
TABLE 2: FEDERAL FUNDING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND
COMBATING TERRORISM, BY YEAR (Budget Authority in Billions of Dollars)
FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003*
Annual Appropriations
OMB Estimate of Federal Funding 20.0 24.2 44.8
Other DoD Funding (not including in OMB estimate)** 0.0 0.0 8.2
Subtotal 20.0 24.2 53.0
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
September 2001 20.0 0.0 0.0
January 2002 0.0 20.0 0.0
August 2002 0.0 24.0 0.0
Subtotal 20.0 44.0 0.0
Total Discretionary 40.0 68.2 53.0
Direct Spending*** 5.2 3.0 2.7
Total Spending 45.2 71.2 55.7
* Level of funding requested for FY 2003.
** This is the $20.1 billion request for the Defense Emergency Response Fund, excluding funding for combat air patrols (which is included in
the OMB estimate), funding related to the Nuclear Posture Review and the $10 billion requested for a war reserve fund.
*** Primarily funding for the Air Transportation Safety and System Stability Act.
Sources: CSBA based on OMB, DoD, CBO and CRS data.
The recently enacted FY 2003
defense budget is about $48
billion above the FY 2001
inflation-adjusted baseline.
11
Steven M. Kosiak
been allocated directly to homeland security and com-
bating terrorism has been used to support a wide va-
riety of other programs and activities. Much of it has
been absorbed by improvements in military pay and
higher operations and maintenance (O&M) costs.
Among the fastest growing segments of the defense
budget has been military health care. These costs have
grown in part because of the expansion of health care
benefits for military retirees, and in part because of
the same factors that have pushed up health care costs
in the civilian market. Another major beneficiary of
the boost in DoD funding since 9-11 has been mili-
tary research and development (R&D). FY 2003 fund-
ing for defense R&D is about $15 billion above the FY
2001 inflation-adjusted baseline for defense R&D.
Among the greatest beneficiaries of this funding
growth have been ballistic missile defense programs,
funding for which has grown by over $2 billion since
FY 2001. The other main beneficiaries are long-
planned next-generation weapons programs, such as
the F-22 fighter, the F-35 fighter and the Comanche
helicopter, which are undergoing engineering and
manufacturing development (EMD), the last phase of
R&D prior to production. It is unclear precisely how
much of the increase in funding for defense R&D since
9-11 has been allocated to programs related to home-
land security and combating terrorism, but it appears
likely that such programs account for only a relatively
modest share of the increase.
ENDNOTES
1. Estimates provided in this analysis were derived based on a va-
riety of sources, including OMB, “Unclassified Report on Gov-
ernment-Wide Spending to Combat Terrorism,” June 24, 2002,
Dan L. Crippen, Letter to the Honorable John M. Spratt, Jr.,
concerning federal spending since the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, and Amy Belasco and Larry Nowels, “Supple-
mental Appropriations for FY 2002: Combating Terrorism and
Other Issues,” CRS, August 9, 2002.
2. OMB, p. 15.
3. The vast majority of this funding will be provided as a result of
The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (P.L.
107-42), which is intended to provide compensation payments
to victims and their families and financial assistance to distressed
airlines. CBO, Letter to Spratt, p. 2.
4. In addition to $64 billion provided through three emergency
supplemental appropriations, Congress added about $700 mil-
lion in funding related to homeland security and combating
terrorism to the some of the 13 regular FY 2002 annual appro-
priations bills it enacted in the immediate aftermath of 9-11.
5. Among other things, reflecting reduced requirements, Congress
cut the level of funding requested for flying combat air patrols
over US cities after 9-11.
6. The $22 billion estimate assumes that the FY 2002 defense ap-
propriations bill included the $14 billion in funding for home-
land security and combating terrorism identified by OMB in
the administration’s FY 2003 request, plus some $8.2 billion in
other DoD funding included in the administration’s request.
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Assessing the Tradeoffs
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T
he terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, pro-
vided shocking evidence that global, mass-casu-
alty terrorism is a very real concern that requires
a concerted national response along multiple
fronts. To clarify and assess the policy and spending
choices that must be made in dealing with the threat,
it is critical that the nation develop a sound frame-
work for thinking about them.
Such a framework would lay out the critical areas
of effort, set priorities among them, and suggest how
the responsibility for each area should be allocated
among the federal government, state and local gov-
ernments, businesses, and individuals. Priorities em-
bodied in the framework should dictate the alloca-
tion of resources among the many possible measures.
Adopting such a framework might help policy mak-
ers to think through the tradeoffs they will face in the
future as they try to match strained budgets to na-
tional priorities. It can also serve as a useful tool for
analysts and for members of the media who wish to
assess the relative weight of effort embodied in na-
tional plans and budgets for countering terrorism.
A SIMPLE FRAMEWORK FOR
THINKING ABOUT NATIONAL OPTIONS
As with other defensive problems, most of America’s
options for dealing with global mass-casualty terror-
ism and its consequences can be grouped roughly into
six layers (see table below for a description of the lay-
ers and illustrative elements within them). The outer-
most layer consists of non-military international mea-
sures aimed at preventing future acts of terrorism. It
includes assisting and rewarding foreign governments
and individuals for their cooperation in the fight
against terrorism, reaching out to audiences abroad
through U.S. and foreign media, providing humani-
tarian assistance to populations affected by the fight,
working with others to prevent failed states, and work-
ing to improve the economic conditions that can cre-
ate a breeding ground for terrorism. A second layer
consists of military solutions aimed at stopping new
acts of terrorism before they start, through retaliation
and other deterrent measures and through offensive
operations to destroy terrorist training camps and
networks abroad and prevent the spread of weapons
of mass destruction.
A third layer, a sort of barrier defense, aims to pre-
vent attackers from reaching directly into the United
States. That layer includes elements of federal law en-
forcement, border and aviation security, and active mili-
tary defenses like combat air patrols. A fourth layer con-
sists of physical and cyber security measures to protect
people, facilities, and information systems from harm
should attacks occur—gates, guns, and guards and their
cyber equivalents. A fifth layer consists of making the
preparations for disaster response and consequence
management that will be needed to recover from and
ameliorate the consequences of future attacks, and a
sixth layer consists of relief and recovery efforts after
an attack occurs. Taken together, those four innermost
layers constitute homeland security.1
Comparing options within the same layer of the
framework can help surface activities that may not
make sense, either because they are duplicative or be-
cause they would cost substantially more or be less
effective than other programs that could achieve simi-
lar aims. For example, both the military’s combat air
patrols and the air marshals on commercial flights
contribute to barrier defenses, the third layer of the
scheme suggested here. The Defense Department spent
Choosing Among Alternative Responses
to Global Mass-Casualty Terrorism
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substantial sums in 2001 and 2002 to operate the com-
bat air patrols poised to shoot down errant commer-
cial flights. Yet expanding the air marshal program
would achieve similar aims, probably at a far smaller
cost and with greater effectiveness and less risk to trav-
elers. Similarly, one can ask whether the large expen-
ditures planned for national missile defense make
sense, given the many other approaches a terrorist
might take to get through the barrier level. As a mini-
mum, one should ask whether the $8 billion a year
the Bush administration plans to spend on missile
defenses is balanced by efforts to prevent weapons of
mass destruction from being produced inside the
United States or brought in through global transpor-
tation networks.
Exploring tradeoffs across layers might be more
complicated. On the one hand, efforts in the outer lay-
ers may offer the greatest payoff; if they work, the in-
ner layers will not be called upon. (Emphasizing the
outer layers is consistent with a preference articulated
by the administration for stopping terrorism as far
from the United States as possible.) Moreover, the ef-
fect of efforts in an outer layer can compound the ef-
fects of inner layers and complicate the situation for
terrorists. On the other hand, the possible threats are
so varied and terrorist networks are evidently so widely
dispersed around the globe that a prudent planner
would want the inner layers no matter how effective
the outer layers might seem against known potential
threats. Thus, for example, even if ballistic missile de-
fenses can be shown to work with some level of effec-
tiveness, local measures to protect people and recover
from future attacks will continue to be important. Nev-
ertheless, comparing a variety of potential solutions
both across and within layers may help to offset a pref-
erence for the complicated over the mundane and for
reacting to the most recent crisis rather than setting
priorities for the longer term.
THE ADMINISTRATION’S
STRATEGY DOCUMENTS
The administration touts a multi-faceted campaign
to disrupt and destroy terrorism worldwide—one that
balances military measures with diplomatic and eco-
nomic ones. Its two key strategy documents, the Na-
tional Security Strategy of the United States of America
and the National Strategy for Homeland Security, lay
out a wide range of concerns and a number of broad
LAYERS OF OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH GLOBAL MASS-CASUALTY TERRORISM
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paths aimed at developing such a campaign. They pro-
vide a good start in identifying and articulating im-
portant areas of effort. Unfortunately, they do not of-
fer much insight into the priorities among three criti-
cal areas of effort: non-military international solutions,
military options, and homeland security measures.
Looking at the problem of combating terrorism
through a schema of layers such as the one proposed
here might help policy makers and analysts to think
through tradeoffs among the many choices discussed
in those documents.
EXAMINING SPENDING CHOICES
IN LIGHT OF THE FRAMEWORK
An examination of federal spending since September
11, 2001, in light of the framework proposed here re-
veals a hierarchy of administration preferences, how-
ever. In budgetary terms, military solutions are clearly
preferred, even though much of the new money de-
voted to the defense department will have little effect in
addressing the problems of terrorism. Nonmilitary in-
ternational measures, the first layer of options, are the
clear losers of the budget sweepstakes. Hefty sums spent
on the sixth layer of the framework, disaster relief and
recovery, reflect both the urgency and the substantial
financial cost of recovering after attacks occur.
ENDNOTES
1. The federal government defines homeland security as “a con-
certed national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the
United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”
White House Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy
for Homeland Security, July 2002, p. 2.
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Using the Economy for Security
David Gold
Director, Project on Security and Development
New School University
E
conomic strength can enhance national security
because it allows a country more choices in
structuring and exercising its military and dip-
lomatic options. At the same time, economic
strength can also give a false sense of security, and lead
decision-makers toward over-stretching their bound-
aries. In addition, economic
strength can create difficul-
ties to the extent it generates
new issues or areas that se-
curity planners need to be
concerned with. Economic
strength can also, however,
provide a set of tools to
achieve security objectives
that can complement, and
in some important in-
stances substitute for, the traditional tools of military
and diplomatic statecraft. This paper will develop ways
of thinking about these alternative tools, and illustrate
their use in three case studies.
GLOBALIZATION AND THE
CHANGING NATURE OF SECURITY
Economic strength is increasingly derived from a
country’s international economic relationships. Mod-
ern globalization, rooted in liberal political and eco-
nomic institutions and increasingly based upon sci-
ence and technological change, has progressed through
two distinct phases. The expansion of international
economic relations in the half-century prior to World
War I was actively supported by, and sometimes led
by, the political and military power of government.
The second phase of modern globalization began
after World War II with governments, led by the United
States, establishing rules of international political and
economic interactions, in the form of inter-govern-
mental agencies including the UN, the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which is now the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, with oth-
ers in following years.
These new rules and insti-
tutions set the stage for
substantial growth in in-
ternational trade, interna-
tional finance, and foreign
direct investment. Today’s
globalization involves
more extensive, or
“deeper,” cross-national
integration than in the
past. Integration can occur at any place in a firm’s value
chain, not only at the level of resource extraction or
assembly and sales.
With economies being tied together more inti-
mately, the cost of disrupting these ties is greater, and
the pressures for maintaining them stronger. Policies
to reinforce economic integration, while promoting
greater democracy and equality, may be capable of
serving and securing traditional security objectives.
Since the end of the Cold War, the primary threats to
U.S. security have come from failed and failing states
and international terrorism. New threats require new
tools and a wider menu of options.
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The Bush Administration has explicitly included eco-
nomic considerations as a component of its national
Economic strength can also, however,
provide a set of tools to achieve security
objectives that can complement, and in
some important instances substitute for,
the traditional tools of military and
diplomatic statecraft.
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security strategy. Previous administrations have done
so also. These considerations are in terms of generali-
ties, such as promoting open markets and free trade,
and give little guidance as to how they would affect
security. Such an approach is inadequate to deal with
the most severe security problems and is often not
practiced in reality, taking second place to military
options.
ECONOMICS AND SECURITY
UNDER GLOBALIZATION
An alternative vision of how economics can enhance
security needs to understand both the strengths and
limitations of open markets. While market-oriented
policies can and have had significant successes in pro-
moting development, they also have limitations. Closer
and deeper integration increases the likelihood, and
raises the cost of, market failure, such as pollution,
inadequate investment in health and knowledge, de-
velopment of social capital, and poverty and inequal-
ity. Transnational crime and violent conflict use the
same modes of integration that characterize global-
ization. These failures imply the need for greater gov-
ernmental and inter-governmental actions, not less.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
AND THE DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The United States and the Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea (DPRK) have been engaged in a long-
running diplomatic dance over the DPRK’s attempts
to acquire, build and disseminate weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems.
Former President Jimmy Carter helped negotiate the
Agreed Framework in 1994, under which the Korean
programs would be halted in return for oil, assistance
in building light water reactors, modest financial as-
sistance to replace the hard currency earnings from
sale of WMD technology, and greater political recog-
nition. The United States was slow in delivering some
of its commitments, and never delivered on the prom-
ise of political recognition. The DPRK, on its part, re-
sumed its nuclear warhead program in 1998. At the
same time, when the DPRK tested a multi-stage ICBM
in 1998, this was taken as evidence of a growing bal-
listic missile threat to the United States, and has formed
part of the rationale for deployment of a ballistic mis-
sile defense system.
The DPRK has indicated on a number of occasions
that it sees its WMD programs as bargaining chips,
and is essentially willing to trade them for economic
assistance and political normalization. Its closest
neighbors, South Korea, Japan and China, seem much
more willing than the United States to follow these
leads and engage in negotiations. The Bush Adminis-
tration, by contrast, has raised the stakes by declaring
the DPRK as a member of an “axis of evil,” by declar-
ing it reserves the right of first use of nuclear weap-
ons, by stating its acceptance of the doctrine of pre-
emptive war, and by blaming the DPRK for every dip-
lomatic setback. The DPRK is a failing economy and
perhaps a failing state. A policy of direct economic
aid, in return for cessation of WMD programs, of pro-
viding incentives for U.S., South Korean, Japanese and
other companies to trade with and invest in the DPRK,
of technical assistance in agriculture, energy, transpor-
tation and other key areas, and of assistance in sup-
porting DPRK enterprises in their attempts to forge
international economic links, promises to reduce ten-
sions far more readily than the present course.
CLOSING A NUCLEAR LOOPHOLE AND
THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES ENRICHMENT CORPORATION
One of the reasons why the world community is pres-
ently concerned with Iraq is the possibility that the
Iraqi government can obtain fissile materials from
clandestine sources, and thereby have nuclear weap-
ons within a one to two year period. The primary
source of such clandestine material would be the sur-
plus weapons stocks of the former Soviet republics.
The United States has several programs designed to
provide financial support and technical assistance to
the former Soviet bloc to effectively manage these
weapons stocks. The Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program (Nunn-Lugar) has had substantial success,
but has also been under-funded and experienced dif-
ficulties in its relations with host governments. A sec-
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ond program, designed to purchase Russian high-en-
riched uranium (HEU) from de-commissioned war-
heads and blend it down into low enriched uranium
(LEU) for use in nuclear power plants, has also had
success and problems. Its problems, which severely
limit its effectiveness, are due to an inappropriate
privatization.
The Clinton Administration approved the
privatization in 1998 of the United States Enrichment
Corporation (USEC), the sole U.S. agent for blending
nuclear fuel. Clinton’s chief economic advisor, and
later Nobel laureate, Joseph Stiglitz opposed the
privatization on the grounds that a private corpora-
tion would have the incentive to buy its source mate-
rial at the lowest price available. Stiglitz predicted that
USEC would buy less LEU than the Russians were
willing to sell, a prediction that turned out to be accu-
rate. The U.S.-Russian HEU agreement has had a
smaller impact on Russian stocks of fissile material
than it could have, a result of the conflict between pri-
vate incentives and national security interests. This is
an example where a government program would be
more likely to have the incentives needed to reduce,
and eventually remove, this material from possible
theft or black market sales. In order to more rapidly
achieve this objective, USEC should be re-national-
ized and the U.S. government should purchase the
entire Russian stock of HEU, blend it down into LEU,
and provide the money and expertise to ensure the
necessary security, transport and storage.
THE PROBLEM OF FAILED STATES
AND THE ROLE OF FOREIGN
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Foreign aid has a bad reputation, the result, in part of
some large abuses (e.g., Mobutu’s Zaire) and over-sold
strategies, but also because with the end of the Cold
War, aid is no longer seen in the United States as hav-
ing the same geo-political significance. Also, budget-
ary politics made aid an easy victim. But aid can have
a substantial role in a broader strategy of political and
economic security. The Bush Administration’s Millen-
nium Aid strategy, designed to underpin an expan-
sion in U.S. foreign aid, is deficient in that the criteria
for aid recipients are too restrictive; only states that
need aid the least will be eligible. Moreover, failing
states may need aid to obtain the political and eco-
nomic institutions that would make them eligible, a
clear catch-22.
An alternative strategy would start with a substan-
tial increase in aid amounts. It would contain an em-
phasis on health outcomes, including HIV/AIDS,
malaria and other major health problems, as well as a
host of less prominent issues. Improving health out-
comes can be a major contributor to internal stability
and economic growth. Also important is the use of
aid to reduce poverty and inequality, and act as a
complement to private initiatives, in conflict situations.
While poverty, as the President and others have stated,
is not by itself a cause of terrorism, failing to address
poverty is one of the roots of the disenchantment with
globalization and modernization.
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NEW PRIORITIES: DISARMING
TERRORISTS AND TYRANTS
In response to the increased vulnerability felt by
Americans in the wake of the September 11th terror
attacks, the Bush administration has moved assertively
to implement its agenda for protecting U.S. territory,
U.S. troops, and U.S. allies from the greatest potential
threat of all: nuclear weapons in the hands of a sworn
U.S. adversary. As President Bush put it in his Octo-
ber 7th, 2002 speech in Cincinnati, “Terror cells and
outlaw regimes building weapons of mass destruction
are different faces of the same evil.”1
The Bush administration is not putting its trust in
treaties or the rule of law to diminish the nuclear dan-
ger, but in its ability to use force or the threat of force
to preempt the development of these devastating
weapons by hostile nations or terrorist groups. In the
administration’s view, the problem is not stopping the
spread of nuclear weapons per se, but keeping them
out of the hands of bad actors. The existing nuclear
arsenals of friendly governments in Russia, Israel, Pa-
kistan, and India are tolerated, while heading off the
potential nuclear arsenals of the so-called “axis of evil”
states of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea has become a top
strategic priority.2 And the Bush-Putin nuclear accord,
which calls for the removal of two-thirds of the U.S.
and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals from active de-
ployment over the next decade, leaves the door open
to the development of a new generation of low-yield,
“bunker busting” nuclear weapons and a multi-bil-
lion dollar modernization of the U.S. nuclear weap-
ons complex.3
If we lived in a world in which countries were ei-
ther “with us or against us,” as President Bush has put
it, this narrow focus on keeping nuclear arms out of
the hands of potential adversaries might make short-
term, pragmatic sense. But the volatility of the cur-
rent geopolitical landscape places severe limits on a
strategy based on rooting out evil regimes. Just as the
National Rifle Association’s slogan – guns don’t kill
people, people kill people – ignores the dangers in-
herent in the widespread availability of firearms, the
Bush administration’s focus on disarming or displac-
ing “rogue” governments ignores the risks posed by
the continuing existence of tens of thousands of
nuclear weapons and massive quantities of bomb-
grade materials
A POST-9/11 STRATEGY:
PREVENTION OR INTERVENTION?
A strategy of military preemption is ill-suited to the
complex task of stemming the spread of nuclear weap-
ons.4 In the real world, as opposed to the world that
exists in the imaginings of Donald Rumsfeld, Dick
Cheney, and Paul Wolfowitz, overthrowing Saddam
Hussein will have virtually no impact on the future abil-
ity of Al Qaeda or some other terrorist group to get its
hands on a nuclear weapon. Just as Willie Sutton robbed
banks because “that’s where the money is,” a terror net-
work intent on getting access to nuclear weapons or
the ingredients thereof is likely to go where the bombs
are. Bribing an underpaid Russian security guard or
infiltrating the Pakistani nuclear program are far more
likely avenues for terrorists seeking a nuclear weapon
than cutting a deal with Saddam Hussein’s regime,
which does not currently possess a nuclear weapon and
would be extremely unlikely to share it with an Islamic
fundamentalist group if it had one.
As a bipartisan task force headed by former Senate
Majority Leader Howard Baker and former White
Curbing the New Nuclear Threat
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House Counsel Lloyd Cutler noted in January 2001,
“the most urgent national security threat to the United
States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruc-
tion or weapons-usable material in Russia could be sto-
len or sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used
against American troops abroad or American citizens
at home.”5 The task force recommended the develop-
ment of a $3 billion per year, ten year plan to safeguard,
destroy, or neutralize Russia’s vast nuclear stockpile,
which it estimated at up to 40,000 strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons plus enough enriched uranium and
plutonium to build tens of thousands more.
Despite its evident concerns about nuclear prolif-
eration, the Bush administration has been slow to
embrace the recommendations of the Baker/Cutler
task force:
 The administration’s first budget submission for
nonproliferation programs was just $759 million,
a cut of roughly $100 million from prior year lev-
els. It took action from a bipartisan coalition in
Congress to push funding up to its current levels
of roughly $1 billion per year, which is still only
one-third of the levels recommended by the Baker/
Cutler task force.6
 At $1 billion per year, the federal government’s en-
tire budget for non-proliferation programs is
roughly equivalent to four days of the estimated
costs for the Bush administration’s proposed mili-
tary intervention in Iraq, which the Congressional
Budget Office has estimated at a cost of about $9
billion per month. Tripling these programs to the
levels recommended by the Baker/Cutler task force
would cost the equivalent of less than two weeks of
the proposed war in Iraq.7
 Due to lack of a reliable funding stream, the Bush
administration’s August 2002 removal of 2.5
nuclear bombs worth of highly enriched uranium
from a research laboratory in Yugoslavia had to rely
on a $5 million contribution from the private
Turner Foundation to seal the deal. The Bush ad-
ministration has failed to support members of
Congress who are seeking to establish a truly glo-
bal non-proliferation fund that could purchase and
destroy nuclear weapons and nuclear materials
from any nation of proliferation concern, not just
Russia. In addition, the administration and hard-
liners in the Congress have blocked efforts to speed
the implementation of Nunn-Lugar cooperative
threat reduction programs in Russia by clinging to
Cold War-style conditions on the provision of this
vital assistance.8
OUTLINES OF A NEW APPROACH
Preventive diplomatic efforts will be far more effec-
tive in stopping the new nuclear danger than preemp-
tive military strikes. In line with a preventive approach,
resources devoted to defending against a possible
nuclear attack should be focused on the most likely
threats. Key elements of such a strategy should include
the following:
 Create a global non-proliferation fund with ad-
equate resources to deal not only with the urgent
task of destroying, securing, or neutralizing Rus-
sian weapons-grade nuclear materials, but to carry
out similar programs in other nations of prolifera-
tion concern. As a first step, the Bush administra-
tion should increase annual U.S. government
spending on nonproliferation programs from $1
billion per year to at least $3 billion per year.9
 Support the implementation of a streamlined and
strengthened regime of sanctions and inspections
in Iraq that focuses narrowly on goods of direct
military concern, improves border, cargo, and port
monitoring in the region, and provides economic
incentives for Iraq’s neighbors to observe the letter
and spirit of the sanctions regime. The first step in
the process involves supporting the efforts of the
current UN inspection team do its work as thor-
oughly and effectively as possible.10
 Resume nuclear talks with North Korea based upon
the principles of the 1994 U.S.-North Korea nuclear
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framework agreement, with a focus on the elimi-
nation of Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile
programs in exchange for a program of economic
assistance and movement towards normalization
of political relations.11
 Reinforce the Bush-Putin accord’s commitment to
reduce deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons
by two-thirds over the next decade with an agree-
ment to accelerate the pace of reductions, destroy
all warheads withdrawn from service under the ac-
cord, and begun the process of destroying Russia’s
substantial stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons.
 Initiate discussions among the five major nuclear
powers designed to set time lines for the deep re-
duction and ultimate elimination of their nuclear
arsenals, accompanied by parallel regional discus-
sions on eliminating nuclear weapons and nuclear
weapons development in the Middle East and
South Asia.
 In line with longstanding assessments by U.S. in-
telligence analysts that a ballistic missile is the least
likely method a hostile nation or terrorist state
would choose for launching a nuclear attack against
U.S. territory, funds should be shifted from the
administration’s $7.8 billion per year ballistic mis-
sile defense program to efforts to protect U.S. ports,
borders, and coast lines against the delivery of a
nuclear weapon carried on a ship or truck. Greater
resources should also be devoted to protecting
nuclear weapons facilities, laboratories, and power
plants against theft or attack. To date, all of these
other necessary efforts combined are receiving a
small fraction of the resources being lavished on
the ballistic missile defense program – a program
that is slated for major funding increases in the light
of President Bush’s recent decision to seek deploy-
ment of an initial system by 2004. To cite just one
example of the disparity in resources involved, fed-
eral resources devoted to stopping international
nuclear smuggling totaled just $86 million for the
ten years from 1992 to 2001, an average of just $8.6
million per year.12
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I
t has become commonplace to say that the “world
changed” fundamentally on 11 September 2001,
when terrorists attacked the Pentagon and World
Trade Center. Actually, it had changed 12 years ear-
lier — in 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold
War order began to crumble worldwide. With this, the
types of threats that had shaped the US military since
World War II began a precipitous decline — and a
different set of challenges rose to prominence. What
preceded the 11 September attack was a decade-long
failure to adapt the US military to new conditions. And
the failure continues still.
During the Cold War, America’s military require-
ments were decided largely by the contest between the
superpower blocs. Today, no interstate confrontation
provides a comparable framework. Instead, what gives
the present security environment its distinctive char-
acter is a tension between the state system and several
zones of acute instability. Appreciating the implica-
tions of this change is key to assessing efforts at mili-
tary transformation.
THE WORLD THAT WAS
Between 1947 and 1989, the superpower blocs poured
approximately $35 trillion (USD 2001) into their con-
test. It rested on two enormous military-industrial-
scientific establishments, which in the 1980s employed
21 million people in the Soviet Union and United
States. These establishments supported dense lines of
military confrontation between the blocs in Asia and,
especially, Europe (where more than 4 million high-
readiness troops faced each other across the “central
front”). They also supported proxies in the develop-
ing world, both governments and insurgents, produc-
ing armed forces there of unusual strength.
Arms transfers constituted one important type of
support, North to South. The arms trade peaked dur-
ing the 1980s, with the total value of transfers for the
decade exceeding $650 billion (USD 2002). By the
close of the Cold War there were 64 dictatorial or
authoritarian “garrison states” in the South that had
been significantly dependent on the superpower
blocs.1 Also, between 1950 and 1989, there were 35
significant “Third World” insurgencies in which the
superpowers (or their core allies) had aided rebel
forces.2
A distinctive mark of the Cold War military sys-
tem was the prevalence of two types of confrontation:
 Very large-scale stalemates or conflicts between
well-supported capital-intensive militaries, possess-
ing armadas of heavy mechanized ground forces,
artillery and missile systems, and advanced com-
bat aircraft; and,
 Intense, protracted civil wars between militarized
central governments and large, fairly well-
equipped, and persistent rebel forces.
The material basis for these types of confrontation
receded as the Cold War ended and the military-in-
dustrial system evolved from a bipolar to unipolar
configuration. Also important in undercutting the
military strength of many developing nations were
changes in the global economy beginning in the early-
1980s. While several high-density confrontations per-
sisted — for instance, on the Korean peninsula — most
nations of concern rapidly lost the capacity to main-
tain large, capital-intensive armed forces in good fight-
ing shape.
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MEASURING CHANGE
Between 1985 and 2001, world military expenditures
declined by one-third. Former and potential adver-
saries of the United States accounted for most of the
reduction in spending. As a group, their military
spending declined 72 percent between 1985 and 2001
— even though one member of this group, China,
actually increased its spending during this period.3 By
contrast, US military spending declined by only 17
percent between these years. Total US spending dur-
ing the 1990s was only 14 percent lower than the ag-
gregate for the 1980s — $3.3 trillion versus $3.8 tril-
lion (2003 USD).
Because US and allied spending did not recede as
much, on average, as the rest of the world’s, the US
and allied share of world spending increased — from
31 percent to 39 percent for the United States, and 57
percent to 73 percent for the allied group as a whole.
(America’s share of world spending is likely to sur-
pass 42 percent in 2003). Standing alone, the United
States moved from spending only 80 percent as much
as the adversary group in 1985 to spending 250 per-
cent as much in 2001.
Turning to the arms trade: it underwent a 65 per-
cent contraction between 1985 and 2001. Arms im-
ports by developing countries fell by three-quarters.
During the last decade of the Cold War about 45 per-
cent of the trade in major weapons was controlled by
the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies, and China.
Today the combined market share of China, Russia,
and Russia’s close allies is less than 23 percent by value.
Whereas they once exported more than $40 billion
worth of major weapons each year, their average an-
nual sales for the period 1997-2001 was only $6.2 bil-
lion per year. By contrast, the United States and its
allies exported $20.4 billion annually during 1997-
2001, accounting for 75 percent of the trade in major
conventional armament.4
Today, US allies in Europe and elsewhere also ac-
count for most arms imports: 69 percent during the
period 1992-1998 and 58 percent during the overlap-
ping period 1997-2001. By contrast, less than 9 per-
cent went to China and so-called “rogue states” dur-
ing 1997-2001.
Just as the United States and its allies have come to
dominate the arms trade, they also conduct most of
the world’s military research, development, and pro-
duction. Today the United States accounts for almost
60 percent of all military R&D spending worldwide;
America’s allies account for another 25 percent. China
and Russia together account for less than 12 percent.
Regarding military production: the United States pres-
ently accounts for more than half of the worldwide
total. Adding European NATO and Japan brings the
military production share of the allies to almost 90
percent. Combined Russian and Chinese production
of major arms constitutes less than six percent of world
production.5
The post-Cold War changes in military trade and
investment patterns paralleled developments in the
political and economic spheres. Together they implied
a sharp and progressive reduction in the number, mag-
nitude, and intensity of traditional military threats to
the West.
NEW ERA, NEW REQUIREMENTS
Among the important catalysts of instability in the
post-Cold War era were (1) the increasing economic
marginalization of many developing nations, which
began in the 1980s, (2) the collapse of the Soviet em-
pire and Yugoslavia, which added to the world system
23 newly independent states (including the former
Warsaw Treaty states), and (3) the sudden termina-
tion or attenuation of bloc support for many former
allies in the South.
Instability was manifest in an increased incidence
of weak or “failed” states, civil and communal violence,
refugee and other humanitarian crises, and criminal
and black market activity, including an increased traf-
fic in illicit drugs and light military weapons. Ampli-
fying these problems were some residual effects of the
Cold War, notably: the broad availability of military
weapons and a surplus of demobilized military per-
sonnel and insurgents, who could not easily be re-in-
tegrated into civil society. Within this latter class a sub-
set that was especially relevant to the events of 9-11
were the 12,000-15,000 “Arab” veterans of the wars in
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Afghanistan, most of whom came from Egypt, Alge-
ria, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.6 These and other veter-
ans of the Afghan wars formed the recruiting pool for
Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda.
Today, there are several broad zones of instability
in the world: one encompassing southern Mexico,
parts of Central America, and the Andean region of
South America. A second, now in remission, comprises
the “transitioning” states along the western border of
Russia. A third encompasses most of Africa south of
the equator. The fourth is a sprawling archipelago that
includes portions of southeast Europe, Africa north
of the equator, the Middle East, and portions of cen-
tral, south, southwest, and southeast Asia. (From a stra-
tegic perspective this fourth zone is distinguished by
the presence of oil and the prevalence of Islam.)
Due to increased trade, migration, and the weak-
ening of nation-state borders, the problems that beset
the zones have a transnational character. This poses a
global challenge whose magnitude is suggested by the
fact that a majority of the world’s nations are either
encompassed, penetrated, or bordered by these zones.
Indeed, as demonstrated on September 11, no place
on earth is completely removed from their influence.
WHAT IS “MILITARY TRANSFORMATION”?
While the world changed rapidly and radically after
1990, America’s armed forces did not — apart from
reducing in size. Rather than refashion its tool box to
fit new conditions, the Pentagon mainstream has tended
to view the new era in terms of the types of tools it had
on hand at the Cold War’s end. This, notwithstanding
the fact that “transformation” has been a Pentagon
watchword since the mid-1990s. But the term can have
various meanings and serve different ends.
Transformation as adaptation
First, transformation can imply adaptation — reshap-
ing and reorienting the military to better deal with
the new security environment. This, the United States
largely failed to do during the 1990s.
America’s Cold War armed forces were built to fight
big, infrequent wars against large, nation-state foes. And
the Cold War era bequeathed the United States a remark-
able capacity to wage global nuclear wars, conventional
naval wars, and big air-land wars involving heavy mecha-
nized armies and powerful air forces on both sides. After
1989, however, the rising requirement was for a capacity
to handle frequent and multiple smaller-scale contingen-
cies of a complex sort: not just traditional combat mis-
sions, but also non-traditional missions, including sta-
bility and humanitarian operations.
Despite the increased prominence of smaller-scale
contingencies during the 1990s, the lion’s share of the
military’s time and resources was devoted to “tradi-
tional” activities and threats. The vaunted “two-war
strategy” made claims on almost all of America’s con-
ventional assets; it dominated planning, training, and
procurement. On average, less than four percent of
America’s conventional military capacity was deployed
regularly in smaller-scale contingencies during the
1990s. (Counting rotation forces, less than one-sixth
of the total were oriented toward such contingencies).
Nonetheless, it was this set of activities that bore the
blame for the military’s readiness problems. Indeed,
readiness was defined as being fully prepared to ex-
ecute the two-war scenario according to schedule. By
the decade’s end, “operations other than war” — es-
pecially peace, stability, and humanitarian operations
— were considered anathema.
During the 1990s, the force mix changed minimally,
with the allocation of money and people among the
services shifting only a few percent. Even today, prepa-
rations for conventional air-land wars absorb at least
70 percent of the Pentagon budget. By comparison,
no more than ten percent of the budget serves counter-
terrorism and homeland protection goals. This allo-
cation of resources reflects the ongoing influence of
the dominant military arms: aircraft carriers, piloted
fighter aircraft, and heavy mechanized ground forces.
Poor adaptation is also evident in the Pentagon’s
failure to procure enough of the type of assets used
most in post-Cold War contingencies. These so-called
“high-demand, low-density” (HD/LD) assets have in-
cluded electronic warfare and suppression of enemy
air defenses (SEAD) aircraft; reconnaissance, surveil-
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lance, and intelligence-gathering aircraft; airlift assets;
A/AO-10 attack/observation aircraft and AC-130 gun-
ships; special operations, intelligence, communica-
tions, military police, and public affairs units as well
as other types of specialized support units. To this list
can be added the Army’s lack of medium-weight units
— a problem it did not begin to rectify until the end
of 1999.
The Pentagon’s failure to substantially alter its mix
of tools cannot be attributed principally to a shortage
of funds. Among the $3.3 trillion spent on defense dur-
ing the 1990s was $716 billion devoted to equipment
purchases. Although this sum is 25 percent less than
what was spent during the 1980s, it was meant to out-
fit a force one-third smaller than its Cold War prede-
cessor. All told, between 1990 and 2001, the US armed
forces bought 45 major surface combatants and sub-
marines, more than 900 combat aircraft, and more
than 2000 armored combat vehicles (while upgrading
another 800).
Transformation as defense reform
A second possible meaning of transformation is de-
fense reform — with the aim of streamlining the
Pentagon’s infrastructure, improving its management
practices, and reducing overhead costs. This type of
change also foundered during the 1990s. Today our
armed forces carry more than 20 percent excess base
structure. In addition, maintenance depots, labs, test-
ing facilities, schools, and hospitals all operate with
significant excess capacity. Efforts to centralize or
privatize support functions have proceeded at a delu-
sory pace. Estimates of potential savings from a more
dedicated program of infrastructure reform range
from $10 billion to more than $20 billion a year.7
Achieving greater efficiency and making wise in-
vestment choices depends on DoD having a reliable
accounting system which, despite years of criticism, it
does not. Untraceable bookkeeping entries presently
run at about $1 trillion and problems of inventory
control are epidemic. For instance, the General Ac-
counting Office reported in 2002 that DoD had lost
track of 1.2 million chemical-biological protective suits
and that the Navy in 2001 had written off $3 billion
worth of goods as lost in transit. In September 2001
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld estimated that reforming
the Pentagon’s financial management system could
reduce costs by $15 billion to $18 billion a year.8
Transformation as
military-technical revolution
Finally, transformation can mean fully adopting new
information technology and restructuring the armed
forces in order to produce an “information age” mili-
tary. Along these lines we might expect the evolution
of smaller more independent tactical units, flattened
command hierarchies, a greater emphasis on networks
(rather than platforms), and a thinning of the bound-
aries between services. The aim would be to increase
the effectiveness, efficiency, and flexibility of the armed
forces. Success in this would allow them to do more,
faster, with fewer resources, and less risk. Although
there has been some progress in this area, it continues
to trail far behind need and opportunity.
The service bureaucracies have tended to “dumb
down” transformation, retaining their emphasis on
buying big-ticket platforms, while minimizing orga-
nizational change. This narrows transformation to a
matter of “recapitalizing” fairly traditional unit struc-
tures along fairly customary lines.
Today, most major procurement items continue to
reflect a design philosophy that is “pre-network” — a
philosophy that loads a relatively few platforms with
capabilities that could be distributed. Of course, most
of these programs have their origin in the 1980s, before
it became common to think in terms of a networked
military. Only a few of these legacy programs have been
eliminated or substantially trimmed back since the Bush
administration took office: all components of combat
aircraft modernization are going forward as is procure-
ment of the Comanche helicopter, CVNX aircraft car-
rier, and V-22 Osprey transport aircraft.
One area of demonstrable progress has been the
services’ capacity for conducting long-range precision
bombardment, which increased several fold during the
1990s. Although also rooted in Cold War programs,
this capability exhibits the transformational qualities
of being distributed (thus flexible and robust) and
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using information to substantially boost efficiency and
effectiveness. But precision strike capabilities alone do
not make for a transformed military — no more than
having a strong and accurate pitching arm is all there
is to excellence in playing baseball.
The 2001 Afghanistan war revealed the limits of pre-
cision strike: Using 24,000 bombs, the United States was
able to topple the Taliban within ten weeks — but it
could not corral Al Qaeda or control subsequent devel-
opments on the ground. Indeed, US victory in Afghani-
stan entailed handing most of the country back to war-
lords. This is not the type of victory that can stabilize
weak states or protect us, in the long run, from the likes
of bin Laden. But the problem is not simply one of
achieving a more thorough and balanced information-
technology revolution. There is a limit to the utility of
integrating new technology as long as the US military
fails to adapt its mix of capabilities to the present secu-
rity environment. In other words: to be fully relevant,
transformation must encompass adaptation.
POLICY CHOICES AND TRADEOFFS
The three meanings of transformation are in no sense
mutually exclusive. It would be more accurate to think
of them as representing different dimensions or as-
pects of change. However, there are distinct choices
within each of them and specific tradeoffs are associ-
ated with these.
Regarding the adaptation of the US military to the
post-Cold War security environment: Altering the mix
of military capabilities at the disposal of the nation im-
plies a wager about the balance of threats during the
next 15 or so years. Although the US military today is
not particularly well-suited to addressing many “new
era” challenges, it is better prepared to address the sud-
den re-emergence of a peer or “near peer” rival em-
ploying traditional forms of power. How one values this
capability depends partly on how likely it seems that a
peer competitor to the United States will emerge within
the next 15 years. Today’s military is also very well-pre-
pared to dispatch smaller traditional foes such as Iraq.
Thus, altering the mix also implies a wager about
whether these are rising or declining threats.
Regarding a technology-driven “revolution in mili-
tary affairs”: Any revolutionary change is bound to be
disruptive in the short term. By contrast, the current
path — procurement and modernization of tradi-
tional platforms and structures — involves minimal
transition costs and ensures institutional stability. For
this benefit, it sacrifices the flexibility that a more
through-going change might bring — and it wagers
that no truly revolutionary military competitor will
emerge within the next 25 or so years.
America’s growing capability for long-range preci-
sion strike represents a partial or truncated revolu-
tion in military affairs (RMA). It is very well-suited to
coercive diplomacy and large-scale attrition warfare
against nation-state foes. Another possible, partial
RMA with wider application might focus on
modularizing US military units and greatly improv-
ing the capacities for joint command, control, and
communication. This could greatly improve force flex-
ibility — a benefit regardless of the type of challenge
that America faces. Because this option would also
produce a more “adaptable” military, it best addresses
concerns about the uncertainty of the security envi-
ronment.
Infrastructure and management reform efforts are
also neutral with regard to threat. By relieving resource
constraints, they would serve whatever type of mili-
tary America chooses to build. However, they entail
transition costs — such as base cleanup — that di-
minish near-term savings. Moreover, they directly
challenge multiple parochial interests, making progress
in this area difficult politically.
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S
ince 1999, Congress has been increasing across
the board pay and other indiscriminate benefits
for active duty and retired military personnel
that will cost between $74 billion and $112 bil-
lion over ten years.1 This spending has little proven
relationship to stated goals of improving recruitment
and retention; it does little, if anything, to help fight
the war against terrorism at home or abroad, and it
raids the DoD budget of resources needed for more
important purposes, such as military readiness and
transformation.
The personnel initiatives under discussion are: 1)
the repeal of the military retirement reforms of 1986,
known as “REDUX,” 2) across-the-board pay increases
above the annual rate of inflation for all military per-
sonnel and DoD civilian bureaucrats, 3) a supplemen-
tary health-care system for military retirees, known
as “Tricare for Life,” and 4) “concurrent receipt,” a de-
parture from policy since 1891 of insisting that mili-
tary retirees, even when disabled and qualified to draw
disability payments from the Veterans Administration,
draw just one stipend for their military service. Con-
gress has also enacted other, less costly, more directed
initiatives, such as selective re-enlistment bonuses and
“pay table reform,” which increased pay for specific
military grades; such measures can be assessed to ad-
dress recruitment and retention more effectively and
are not included in this analysis.
INDISCRIMINATE PENSION
AND PAY INCREASES
In January 1999, Senator John Warner (R.) of Vir-
ginia, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, introduced S.4 to repeal the 1986 re-
forms of the military retirement system, thereby ar-
bitrarily increasing pensions for thousands of future
military retirees, whether they will be passed over for
promotion or perform a non-critical military spe-
cialty, or not. CBO assessed the ten year costs at $15
billion.2 S.4 also included a 4.8% pay increase to all
military personnel regardless of specialty or status
and even to all Defense Department civilian person-
nel, even though there had been efforts to reduce the
size of the civilian cohort. This pay raise was 60%
higher than the 3.0 increase in the consumer price
index (CPI) and added over $17 billion to the bill.3
The impetus for the bill was the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) who wanted to fill a 13% “pay gap” between
military personnel and private sector civilian pay lev-
els to address recruiting and retention problems.
Rejecting an appeal from Secretary of Defense Wil-
liam Cohen to delay consideration4 but after under-
the-table urging from the JCS,5 Senate Majority Leader
Trent Lott (R-MS) rushed the bill to Senate consider-
ation in February 1999. He had reason to hurry. CBO
had been researching the issue, and its findings were
devastating: “the Military Retirement Reform Act of
1986 [REDUX] is not having a discernible, widespread
effect on the retention of mid-career personnel…. the
13 percent pay gap figure cited in the press does not
accurately measure what it purports to and … in gen-
eral, the whole notion of relying on a pay gap esti-
mate to set pay raises is inappropriate.”6 And, further-
more, “If retention or recruiting is a problem only for
some services, some occupations, or a few years of ser-
vice [as was known to be the case], then other solu-
tions — such as bonuses or changes in the pay tables
— may be more cost effective than across the board
increases.”7 In other words, the hugely expensive re-
peal of REDUX and passing general pay increases were
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mostly irrelevant to the stated goals of fixing reten-
tion and recruitment.
In addition, a draft GAO study8 weakened the case
for S.4 even more: “money has been overstated as a
factor affecting decisions to stay in or leave the mili-
tary” and “other issues — a lack of spare parts, health
care system concerns, too many deployments and even
dissatisfaction with military leaders — have at least as
much effect on retention, in some cases more effect,
than money.”9 It was not a mes-
sage the proponents of S.4
wanted to hear; their solutions
were not just expensive, but
false.
The messages from CBO
and GAO were ignored. The
Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee held hearings on CBO’s
findings only after the Senate
passed S.4. After hearing CBO
and GAO in hearings, the
House of Representatives also decided to ignore them
and to adopt similarly indiscriminate measures. Af-
ter S.4 became law, DoD’s retention problems pre-
dictably continued10 until other factors reduced them,
such as patriotic enlistments and decisions to remain
in service after September 11, 2001, a deteriorating
civilian economy, and selective pay and benefits tar-
geted at the problematic personnel areas. Notably
however, even after the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, DoD had to initially enforce a “stop loss
order” to force personnel in critical specialties to re-
main in military service.
TRICARE FOR LIFE
One of the persistent complaints GAO found about
the quality of life for active duty personnel was the
“Tricare” HMO-type health system. Congress’ re-
sponse was to mandate the same system for military
retirees, who had been complaining that they weren’t
getting the “free healthcare for life” they were prom-
ised when they enlisted. The retirees resented being
forced into the civilian Medicare system and the fees
it required them to pay. Under “Tricare for Life,” they
were granted almost wholly cost-free health coverage
for any bills from providers or pharmacies not already
covered by Medicare.
The most stunning aspect of Tricare for Life is its
expense due in large part to the absence of incentives
to control utilization. CBO estimated cost at a net $40
billion,11 but when the Defense Department looked at
the program, it estimated an additional $3.9 billion
just for the first year. When they came to the Defense
Department in 2001, DoD’s
new Comptroller and Secre-
tary of Defense were aghast.
Comptroller Dov Zakheim
noted that healthcare had be-
come a “huge portion” of the
defense budget. Secretary
Rumsfeld noted that the costs
were threatening to devour re-
sources needed to transform
the military and, later, to fight
the war against terrorism.12
DoD requested legislative efficiencies, but Congress
rejected most of them, and costs continued to rise: by
$5.2 billion in 2002 and $1.0 billion in 2003.13 Only
after Congress was strenuously urged by a small num-
ber of Members to pay for all of the benefits it had
legislated was the additional money appropriated.
Extended beyond the active duty force to retirees,
Tricare’s impact on recruitment, retention, and readi-
ness is tenuous, at best. Growing faster than the DoD
budget, it will become a primary driver of expanding
DoD costs at rates well above inflation that add no weap-
ons, research, training, or personnel to U.S. defenses.
CONCURRENT RECEIPT
Since 1891, it had been federal policy that military re-
tirees, who also qualify for veterans disability pay-
ments, may receive just one pension for their military
service, and the amount of veterans disability pay-
ments were deducted from military pensions. In early
2001, staffers for the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee and for Republican Leader Trent Lott were spread-
ing the word on Capitol Hill that the next major ini-
tiative they were advocating with support from the JCS
Other issues — a lack of spare
parts, health care system
concerns, too many deployments
and even dissatisfaction with
military leaders — have at least as
much effect on retention, in some
cases more effect, than money.
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was “concurrent receipt”: legislation to remove the
military retirement offset for retirees who also received
a disability payment from the Veterans Administra-
tion. CBO scored the cost at $40 billion over ten years;
14 DoD estimated the costs at $16 billion more.15
Companion bills (S.170 and H.R.303) were intro-
duced by Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) and Congress-
man Michael Bilirakis (R-FL) and ultimately accumu-
lated a huge, veto-proof majority in Congress as co-
sponsors. Concurrent receipt amendments were added
to both the congressional budget resolution and Na-
tional Defense Authorization bills but failed in House-
Senate conferences. The cost intimidated Members,
and Senator Reid quietly told Senate conferees it would
be OK with him if his own proposals were dropped.16
In 2002, concurrent receipt was again added to the
National Defense Authorization bill, but Members of
the Senate Armed Services Committee became con-
cerned that their committee would be “irrelevant” if
the bill were vetoed, as promised by Secretary
Rumsfeld, if concurrent receipt remained in it. 17 They
were also worried that military retirees would become
a permanently alienated constituency if concurrent
receipt was stripped out again. As a result, they adopted
a program just for military retirees who had been in-
jured in combat and were significantly disabled. A re-
liable cost estimate was not available; CRS was only
able to report that the costs would be somewhere be-
tween $2 and $10 billion.18 Veterans groups were in-
censed that only a small portion of the 550,00 dis-
abled military retirees would qualify. The compromise
was, nonetheless, adopted with Senator Warner at-
tempting to mollify the angry retirees by calling the
provision a “beachhead in law” for more benefits in
the future.19
Concurrent receipt had been characterized as “an
absolute disaster” by DoD Comptroller Zakheim,20 and
as something that “would divert critical resources away
from the war on terrorism, the transformation of our
military capabilities and important personnel pro-
grams,” by Secretary Rumsfeld.21 Although the costs,
whatever they turn out to be, would come out of fund-
ing for other DoD programs,22 — or as recommended
by the Senate Appropriations Committee directly from
emergency funding to support the war against terror-
ism23 — and although the limited benefit would be a
precedent for more expensive legislation later, Secre-
tary of Defense Rumsfeld retracted his veto threat, and
the bill was signed into law on December 2, 2002.
CONCLUSION
A proposal with initial costs ranging somewhere be-
tween $2 billion and $10 billion and that could grow
to $40 billion was incorporated into the long term
defense budget. These costs were added to the $32 bil-
lion for indiscriminate pay and pension increases and
to the $40 billion for supplemental healthcare for re-
tirees to constitute immense cost (somewhere between
$74 to $112 billion) for benefits having little direct
bearing on the recruitment and retention problems
of the active duty manpower force.
The ability to pay for more important readiness,
modernization, and war fighting programs was also
commensurately reduced. With the federal budget in
deficit, with the rising costs of fighting the war against
terrorism, and with the continuing increase in other
defense spending, these indiscriminate initiatives are
no longer affordable.
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Homeland Security and the States
N
ew spending is required at the state and local
level for homeland security. However, deficits in
state budgets suggest that their own spending
on these programs will not be adequate.
The state and local costs of first response and other
homeland security initiatives must be assessed to
evaluate the extent of federal grants needed to reach
nationally desired levels.
For efficiency, homeland security grant programs
could be planned on a regional basis, rather than lo-
cal or state based. Additionally, a mix of formula and
project grants is suggested so that aspects of state and
local spending on homeland security that are likely to
require long-term planning and some certainty of
funding will receive formula grants while others will
receive project grants. Further research is needed to
identify the appropriate regional configuration of
homeland security grants.
The Homeland Security Bill of November 25, 2002:
 Involves some 22 federal agencies with 170,000 fed-
eral employees and has a proposed estimated bud-
get of $37.7 billion for fiscal year 2003.
 The mission of the new Department of Homeland
Security is to help prevent, protect against, and re-
spond to acts of terrorism on American soil.
While the 50 states are the main agents for implemen-
tation, how to finance this is unclear:
 State budgets are the worst for decades with a com-
bined gap of $37 billion for fiscal year2 (FY) 2002.
 Low reserves and the expected FY 2003 gap will
raise borrowing costs.
 Borrowing can nonetheless help fund some infra-
structure needs, but current costs such as training
police and fire personnel must come from:
• State and local government’s own sources (taxes,
fees and charges),
• Or from intergovernmental grants.
Apart from the limited fiscal capacities of states and
localities to fund homeland security:
 Sub-national governments are likely to spend less
than needed because benefits financed by one state
or city are in part received externally by other states
and localities.
 Also, some states and localities could jeopardize the
safety of neighboring jurisdictions by choosing to
incur lower anti-terrorism expenditures than so-
cially desirable.
Although the current federal reinsurance program
creates a safety net by absorbing risks of losses from
catastrophes, new monetary and other incentives are
needed to address:
 The actual fiscal capacity constraints of states and
local governments.
 The disincentives from externalities that benefit
states and cities that lack adequate programs at the
expense of those that make appropriate investments
in security.
Federal incentive grants will be important; and their
design must consider:
 James K. Galbraith
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 Which level of government (state, local or regional)
should receive the grants?
 Whether the grants should be designed as match-
ing grants or non-matching grants?
 Whether distribution should be by formulae or as
project grants on a case-by-case basis?
 What conditions, if any, should the grantors im-
pose on the use of grant money?
Federal homeland security legislation identifies four
main areas to be funded in FY 2003:
 First response capacities: $3.5 billion proposed,
which is about 9% of the $37.7 billion total.
 Defense against bio-terrorism: $5.9 billion, about
16% of the total.
 Securing America’s borders: $10.6 billion, about
28% of the proposed total.
 Aviation security: $4.8 billion proposed, about 13%
of the proposed total.
An additional $5.3 billion is proposed for other non-
Department of Defense programs, plus $6.8 billion
for DoD programs within the homeland security bud-
get; and $0.7 billion for information technology, mak-
ing a total of $37.7 billion proposed for homeland se-
curity in FY 2003.
Three of these areas give key roles to states and lo-
cal governments:
 First response duties using police, firefighters and
health personnel in case of catastrophic attack are
to be covered by most of the $3.5 billion federal
first-responder allocation.
 Defending against bio-terrorism using $1.2 billion
or 20% of the related federal budget to strengthen
state and local health systems, plus $0.4 billion to
deliver pharmaceuticals.
 Building technology infrastructure with cyberspace
security ($0.7 billion).
The remaining initiatives (73% of federal spending)
is proposed for securing America’s borders, aviation
security and other initiatives where states and local
authorities are to act as partners without having bud-
getary control.
A 2002 report America Still Unprepared—America
Still in Danger of the Independent Task Force chaired
by former senators Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman
described state and local preparedness:
 State and local first responders (police, fire and
medical emergency personnel) are basically unpre-
pared for apprehending and responding to terror-
ist attacks.
 They have woefully inadequate access to commu-
nication equipment and to necessary intelligence
data, training and protective gear in case of a ter-
rorist attack.
 The fiscal capacity of states and localities needs to
be augmented and coordinated to address their vul-
nerabilities with flexibility adapted to the local and
regional needs.
State and local budget shortfalls are unprecedented
since the 1930s:
 State shortfalls, partly caused by post-9/11 home-
land security burdens, were $4 billion in FY 2002,
$3 billion spent to combat bio-terrorism and to es-
tablish emergency communications systems and $1
billion for critical infrastructure protective mea-
sures.
 Local spending on homeland security is estimated
by the U.S. Conference of Mayors as having been
approximately $2.6 billion for fiscal year 2002.
 There is no systematically collected information on
how much of the state and local government ex-
penditure on homeland security was funded by fed-
eral grants. 3
Considering which level of government should receive
grants involves choices affecting more then 87,000
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overlapping jurisdictions of federal, state and local au-
thorities:
 The National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference
of Mayors and the National Association of Coun-
ties ask that the funds for first response programs
go directly to the local governments to avoid the
state “skimming a percentage for administrative
costs…. and a considerable slowing down of the
funding timeline when a state gets involved — due
to the state application process….” 4
 Alternatively, the Bush Administration has pro-
posed a disbursement5 wherein states would keep
25% of the $3.5 billion first-responder funds and
distribute the remaining 75% to local governments,
with a 25% local “in-kind” match, to be distrib-
uted on a case-by-case basis as project grants, not
as formula grants.
 A regional model for planning and administering
first response programs could provide an interme-
diate ground between the federal proposal to as-
sign this task to the states and the pitch by local
governments for direct access to the federal funds.6
 The regional model has been used successfully in high-
way and environmental programs (for example in per-
mit trading programs for reduction of air pollution).
 Partnerships between localities are more likely to
succeed at a regional level than at a state level, and
the regional model, as compared to the local model
is less cumbersome for disbursement of federal in-
tergovernmental grants.
Achieving national preparedness and response goals
will depend on federal, state and local governments
forming partnerships among themselves and with
non-governmental entities, and on the appropriate
design of intergovernmental grants:
 The federal grant design and allocation criteria can
be used to systematically encourage the adoption
of partnership models for first response programs.
 The intergovernmental grant literature7 suggests that
matching grants are appropriate when there are posi-
tive externalities from the program that benefit na-
tional interests. Any jurisdiction can thus be com-
pensated for benefits from its program that accrue
to other jurisdictions. The grant thus lowers the cost
of the program to the grantee — bringing costs into
line with the benefits realized by the grantee, and
when externalities differ across jurisdictions, match-
ing rates can be made to vary accordingly.
 Non-matching grants (community income supple-
menting grants) are appropriate for programs de-
signed to equalize the fiscal capacities of different
jurisdictions. These grants do not affect the cost of
the program in the grantee’s jurisdiction.
If the first response programs are implemented by lo-
calities individually:
 Matching grants can be used to offset the costs of
positive externalities to local authorities, and
matching rates based on the size of the externali-
ties generated.
 A combination of non-matching and matching
grants can help to equalize fiscal capacity for com-
munities that could not otherwise afford the stipu-
lated matching funds.
If a regional model is adopted for first response pro-
grams with regional boundaries chosen to minimize
costs and externalities, a mix of matching and non-
matching grants would allow for the most socially
desirable fiscal policy.
Disbursement of money on a case-by-case project
grant basis or by formula involves choices:
 The federal proposal for first response programs
indicates that the grant money will be disbursed
on a case-by-case basis.
 Considering the magnitudes of the risks from ter-
rorist attacks and the need for long-term planning,
a combination of project and formula grants would
be more appropriate.
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 The formula grant would provide implementing
jurisdictions with an assured source of baseline
funding for functions requiring continuity of ex-
penditure such as training and maintenance of se-
curity standards and interoperability of informa-
tion systems.
 Project grants could be used to fund activities where
full responsibility for sustaining support of the pro-
gram is to be transferred to the implementing ju-
risdiction over time.
In conclusion, there is a clear mismatch between what
is required for state and local homeland security and
what is currently available in terms of funding and
adequate planning:
 States and localities are facing increasing demands
on their budgets and unprecedented budget short-
falls unequaled since the 1930s.
 The federal government’s proposed FY 2003 fund-
ing would cover only about 60% of the state and
local expenditure on first response programs for
homeland security.
 Preparedness for terrorist attacks requires coopera-
tion at all levels of government.
 The federal government can encourage and sup-
port cooperation between federal, state and local
agencies through technical support and monetary
and non-monetary incentives.
 The state and local costs of first response and other
programs administered and funded at sub-national
levels need to be assessed comprehensively so that
the federal government can evaluate the extent of
federal involvement required to bolster spending
on these programs to nationally desirable levels.
 An efficient system of federal intergovernmental
grants is required to realize economies of scale, stra-
tegic complementarities, and to subsidize (appropri-
ately) the state and local provision of public services
for homeland security. This can be done using a com-
bination of matching and non-matching grants.
 Pilot studies, conducted by research universities,
examining regional models for implementing and
funding homeland security programs (including
intergovernmental grants) will go a long way to-
ward bringing new ideas to a policy area that is
likely to dominate public debate in the foreseeable
future.
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s our homeland secure?  The answer is no if we
consider economic security.  As much as polls in-
dicate that Americans feel enough is being done
with respect to ‘homeland security,’ most Ameri-
cans are very pessimistic about the economy.  In spite
of what the Administration might claim, Americans
justifiably believe that the economy is in a recession
and that it is becoming worse.1
Congress and the Administration have devoted an
enormous amount of time, energy and money to mili-
tary responses to security needs, but other needs of
Americans – a stable job, affordable home, a good edu-
cation for their children – have not received adequate
attention. Yet, economic security is important for na-
tional security, too. A healthy, better educated, more
united populace will be better equipped to deal with
the diffuse, unpredictable threats emerging from a
changing world.
Four issues of family and community needs are
examined below. All of these needs could have and
should have been addressed by the Administration and
Congress, but were not.
The unemployment rate is currently hovering
around 6% with 1.5 million jobs being lost in 2001
and another 150,000 in 2002. More indicative of cur-
rent labor market conditions is that long-term unem-
ployment is growing. The median duration of unem-
ployment is steadily rising and is at its highest since
1983. Based on historical trends, analysts argue that
long-term unemployment, while already having well
more than doubled over the past year, is actually go-
ing to continue to rise well into 2003.2
The safety net of unemployment insurance runs
out after 26 weeks. Since long-term unemployment is
growing, the safety net is not long enough. Congress
did enact legislation to extend unemployment ben-
efits earlier in 2002. The temporary extended unem-
ployment compensation (TEUC) was part of the Job
Creation and Worker Assistance Act passed in March.
The act enabled all workers to be eligible for an addi-
tional 13 weeks of benefits, which undoubtedly helped
many workers. It also provided for a further exten-
sion based on the rise in individual state unemploy-
ment rates, but only a small handful of states quali-
fied based on the restrictions.3 This meant that 95%
of unemployed workers who exhausted their benefits
could not qualify for the further extended benefits.
By late 2002, 1.5 million workers lost their benefits.
Congress adjourned in November knowing that many
American families would face the holiday season ei-
ther without benefits or losing them shortly after.4
The Senate and House did introduce legislation ex-
tending unemployment benefits, yet lacked the political
will to get it done. The price tag of the Senate bill, $4.9
billion, pales in comparison to the business tax breaks it
voted for earlier in the year in another package.
Defenders of the package claimed that tax breaks
for business would stimulate the economy, thereby
creating jobs. However, tax or other incentives to
stimulate investment do not work during a recession
because firms have excess capacity. Even though this
basic understanding of economics exists, and has been
born out by recent data, Congress prioritized spend-
ing on business over workers.
More than half of unemployed workers never even
receive unemployment benefits. Low-waged unem-
ployed workers face additional challenges. On aver-
age, only 20% of low-wage workers receive unemploy-
ment insurance due to rules regarding the minimum
level of earnings required for eligibility.5
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The federal minimum wage has not been increased
since 1997. But after five years, the gains from that
increase have been more than eroded through infla-
tion. Today’s minimum wage of $5.15 per hour (or
less than $11,000 working full-time year-round) re-
mains at less than three-quarters of its value in the
1960s and 1970s. Raising the minimum wage is dis-
missed by many politicians because of the myth that
low-waged workers are part-time teen-agers.  This is
just a myth. The vast majority of low-waged workers
in the US is not teenaged, and is not part-time; these
workers are adults trying to get
by, many of whom have a fam-
ily to support.  Seven million
people in this country earn the
minimum wage with over ten
million earning just a dollar (or
less) above. 6
Legislation to raise the mini-
mum wage was introduced in
2001 and 2002, but no action
resulted. This is the case in spite
of the absolutely trivial effect on the federal budget and
the over 15 million people it would help (directly and
indirectly). Raising the minimum wage would also be
good for the economy through the increased consump-
tion of millions of people. 7
The consequences of low-wage work are obvious.
For example, food insecurity has risen between 1999
and 2001.8 Finding affordable housing can be another
struggle.
Across the country, the gap between wages and
rents has continued to widen. On average, a house-
hold must earn $14.66 per hour (full-time, year-
round) in order to afford a 2-bedroom, safe, decent
apartment and still meet the household’s other basic
expenses. About 40% of renters across the country do
not have affordable housing.9 Almost one in six of all
American families does not have affordable housing.
Further, more than 14 million American families have
critical housing needs where housing costs consume
at least 50% of their household income.10
The response of the Bush Administration — to cite
the slight increase in rental vacancies — has missed
the point. There is insufficient affordable housing.
Recent building has been devoted to upscale housing,
not affordable housing and tight conditions in par-
ticular communities have driven rents sky high.
Spending on housing assistance and HUD are less
than half of what they were 25 years ago. Affordable
housing appears to be off the radar screens of Con-
gress, explaining why the issue has reached such a cri-
sis level. State budgets, most of which have had severe
budget gaps recently, are not able to provide more af-
fordable housing and local and state officials are call-
ing for federal help.
Legislation has been intro-
duced into both houses which
would create a National Hous-
ing Trust Fund. The objectives
of the Trust Fund would be to
build, preserve, or rehabilitate
1.5 million affordable housing
units by 2010. A trust fund
could be established by using
the surplus of the Federal
Housing Administration Mutual Mortgage Insurance
Fund. This fund has a capital adequacy ratio consid-
erably above what is required for safety and sound-
ness of the program. Using the surplus of this fund
would provide $26 billion for the Trust Fund.
For every $5 billion spent on housing construction,
an estimated 185,000 jobs are created.11 A similar case
can be made for school construction and rehabilitation.
Research done by the GAO in the mid- to late-1990s
found that one-third of public schools needed exten-
sive repair or replacement of at least one building.12 A
more recent report indicated that three-quarters of
schools needed to spend money to put school build-
ings into good overall condition and about one-quar-
ter of schools were overcrowded. The need for school
construction amounted to $127 billion.13
School construction is typically financed by bonds
which add interest payments as a further cost. Federal
government spending amounts to only about 2% of
total school construction spending. This pales in com-
parison with other infrastructure projects.
So while there is no explicit trade-
off between military and non-
military spending per se, a trade-
off does seem to have occurred
between military issues and
economic security.
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Legislation has not accomplished much. The Edu-
cation Infrastructure Act of 1994 was enacted to ad-
dress school construction needs, but it was never
funded. Other legislation, such as providing credit for
qualified school modernization bonds never made it
out of committee.
The list of community and family needs which
Congress passed over in order to spend time on de-
bating war and other military matters is considerable:
Congress failed to pass legislation that would extend
expiring funds for the State Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program. The OMB projected that if no action
was taken, almost one million children would lose
SCHIP coverage between 2003 and 2006.14 After an
almost $40 billion collective state fiscal crisis in FY2002
and more state budget gaps this year, Congress has
done nothing to alleviate the burden. And, it imple-
mented tax cuts which would decrease state tax rev-
enues in most states. Almost half of state budget cri-
ses have been triggered at least in part by ballooning
Medicare and other health expenditures. Congress and
the Administration have not taken action on this is-
sue, or on prescription drugs. Welfare re-authoriza-
tion and energy policy were left incomplete by the end
of the year.
Out of the 13 appropriation bills in the annual bud-
get process, only two were passed. The two bills that
were signed into law were related to the military and
represent an enormous increase in military spending.
Congress also passed a motion on the use of force
against Iraq requested by the Administration. Congress
also passed the Homeland Security measure which cur-
tailed 170,000 federal employees’ labor rights.
So while there is no explicit trade-off between mili-
tary and non-military spending per se, a trade-off does
seem to have occurred between military issues and
economic security. Congress and the Bush Adminis-
tration became pre-occupied with foreign policy and
have done practically nothing on issues of economic
security.
Yet, transforming the military from the Cold War
strategy to new threats, as argued elsewhere in this
brief, could save money. Extending unemployment
benefits could cost as little as $5 billion, less if the
economy does indeed recover. Increasing the mini-
mum wage by $1.50 would cost as little $16 million
over a three-year period. Establishing a National Hous-
ing Trust Fund might only mean transferring surpluses
from one fund to another. The federal government
could make a huge difference in the condition of
school by committing at least $8 billion a year, the same
as is now spent on ballistic missile defense.
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